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Problem description. 
Negotiating a reform and then getting it accepted is a major task within the European Union system. 
From the need or idea for a reform is presented to the final vote of acceptance or disapproval there 
is a complex decision-making process involving many actors with different agendas and interests.  
It is apparent that the actors involved in the process have influence on the outcome of the negotia-
tions, but the institutional structure also plays an important role. The institutional framework of the 
European Union originates from the treaty of the union and the community, and the complex set-up 
of this institutional structure creates the room of manoeuvre where it is possible exert influence for 
the involved parts - through formal or informal channels. It is utopia to believe that the distribution 
of preferences of the actors involved in the decision-making happens without conflicts for the sim-
ple reason that some actors have more power and influence than others. This will give advantages 
for some reform interests and disadvantages for others.  
 
If we look at the history of the EU there is one area, which, at least in the last 20 years, has been 
objective for many discussions. The Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) has more than any other 
issue divided the decision-making forces in the EU internally and EU and the world society in two 
parts. Internally in the EU there have been diverging interests between the member states, some 
advocating for CAP reform and trade liberalisation, others striving to keep status quo.1 A pressure 
for adjusting the agriculture policy according to several enlargements of the EU with new member 
states have demanded reforms of the CAP. However, the history shows us that the agricultural pol-
icy in the EU has been stable and the reforms undertaken only have been moderate. Due to the fact 
that the agricultural expenditure has kept rising constantly and sometimes dramatically2, it is obvi-
ous that no reforms have broken that trend, though there have been attempts of changing the CAP. 
One of the most far-reaching reforms in the history, the MacSharry-reform, is hard to describe as 
radical, as it didn’t change the use of considerable subsidies in agriculture, and only altered the way 
in which the subsidies were paid to farmers.3 
We will have to elaborate the definition of reforms because there are different opinions of the de-
gree of reforms, which we have to clarify before we can question the absence of radical reforms. To 
                                                 
1
 Moyer (1993):114, Sheingate (2000):348-349, Rieger (2005): 170 
2
 See table below 
3
 Grant (1997):2. Grant stresses, that reforms of the CAP have introduced new instruments for the management of the 
policy, but they have not fundamentally changed the nature of the policy itself.” Daugbjerg (1999):409 adds: “The agri-
culture policy reforms undertaken have been moderate, though they have often been labelled radical.” 
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classify the scope of the reform we have chosen to introduce a model made by Hall and later modi-
fied by Daugbjerg.4 According to Daugbjerg (and Hall) there are 3 types of policy reforms: 
• First order changes: Instrument settings, or levels, are changed. Objectives, instruments 
and policy paradigms remains the same. 
• Second order changes: Objectives, instruments and their settings are altered. Policy para-
digms remains the same. 
• Third order changes: Objectives, instrument settings, instruments and policy paradigms 
are all changed. 
First and second order changes are moderate reforms, whereas third order changes are radical ones.  
If we try to implement agriculture policy into this model, a first order change could alter price lev-
els, a second order change would bring about a shift in policy instruments like from subsidizing the 
products to subsidizing the income of the farmers instead. A third order policy change could be if 
the state cut all supporting and leave prices of agriculture products to be determined by the marked 
forces. There has been no fundamental changes or cuts in the CAP budget throughout the history of 
agriculture reforms, which is why we claim that the reforms have only been moderate and not radi-
cal. 
The figures below show that even though the CAP has diminished its impact on the total EU 
budget, the actual expenses have increased. 
Expenses in relation to total EU budget
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By recognizing that no radical reforms of the CAP have been implemented despite increasing ex-
penditure of the agriculture and the internal pressure, this project sets out to show which barriers 
and obstacles there can occur in the institutional structure of the decision-making process that re-
frain more radical reforms from happening.  
 
                                                 
4
 Daugbjerg (1999): 412 
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There is also an international pressure for reform5, which is expressed in the context of WTO-
negotiations. Where the members of WTO, with US and Cairns group in front, have advocated for 
extensive liberalisation on the agriculture area, the EU has always insisted on the need for an inter-
ventionist agriculture policy. The main objective of the CAP is still protection of farmers, which 
makes the CAP as anti-market. This conflict results in making agriculture a central issue that always 
isolates EU in the international trade negotiations.6 This protectionist approach has accelerated the 
external pressure from third countries and the WTO to push the EU to liberalise the CAP in order to 
make the global trade in agriculture fairer. Since the CAP is fundamental unchanged it seems like 
the EU has so far succeeded in resisting the external pressure.  
We are questioning the lack of radical reforms of EU agriculture policy in spite of both internal and 
international pressures in the WTO. We examine the decision-making process to see how proposals 
are developed and which institutional barriers that can constraint the process of radical reform.  
 
The CAP policy influences the budget, the environment and trade and any proposal would therefore 
have to not just satisfy one Directorate General, but several. The conflicting interests and the com-
plexity of the structure of the EU-policy system results in lack of flexibility and transparency in the 
decision-making process and might sustain the prolonged decisions-making process of reforming 
the CAP.  
The considerations above open up for the aim of this project, which is to examine the institutional 
barriers in the process of implementing a proposal - from making a draft to the approval at EU 
level, to the final negotiations at WTO-level. This leads us to the problem we will attempt to an-
swer: 
 
Which institutional barriers are embedded in the EU decision-making process that are able to 
impede radical reform of the CAP? 
  
In order to answer this research question, we will also look at the following three sub questions.  
Where in the formal structure of decision-making are there institutional barriers? 
Where and how is it possible for interests to informally exert influence on the decision making? 
And how are the institutional structure able to withstand the pressure from the WTO? 
                                                 
5
 Patterson (1997):136-137  
6
 Rieger (2005):162 
Page 5 of 39 
By formal we mean the process as described in the treaty, and by informal we mean the channels of 
influence that are not described in the treaty. 
 
Method of the project 
The purpose of the method is to give an overview of the structure of the project through a project 
design, and to clarify our theoretical point of departure, choice of theories and finally to place the 
theories in a broader context.   
Project design 
To examine the scope of the barriers which may be embedded in the institutional structure of deci-
sion-making we find it necessary to take two theoretical approaches in hand and use them to clas-
sify the barriers and obstacles to reform in the institutional structure. 
First we introduce Mark Pollack’s Principal-Agent theory, which can explain the relation between 
the member states as principals and the Commission as the agent and classify the formal institu-
tional barriers. Here we examine the delegated powers delegated from the Member States to the 
Commission in the CAP decision-making process within the EU and at the international level of 
trade negotiation and, how member states are able to control the actions of the Commission and 
retain their delegated powers.  
 
Complementary to the principal-agent theory we introduce Carsten Daugbjerg’s approach to Policy 
Networks, which show us the complexity of the interactions between the political actors of a policy 
area, and how the configuration of the networks can help to exclude the reform-oriented from the 
policy-making process. The purpose of this part is to show how policy networks are embedded in 
the institutional structure and thereby enable interests and preferences to influence the decision-
making process. 
This combination of the two approaches above serves to show a broader and more differentiated 
analysis of the research question, where the formal institutional barriers that can impede radical 
reform in the decision-making process are classified, and then supplemented with the informal bar-
riers, which emerge with the influences of the policy networks. 
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In the last part of this project we analyse the decision-making process in the EU.7 The analysis is 
structured in subparagraphs, each dealing with a specific stage of the decision-making process. 
These subparagraphs are further divided in three parts. First; the legal basis of the decision-making 
process and the EC institutions competences are described as established in the EC Treaty. Second 
we show how these powers are executed in practise, and how the process of developing and imple-
menting proposals regarding CAP reforms within the EU decision-making process are scrutinized. 
In the third and final part we are able to identify both formal and informal institutional barriers em-
bedded in the decision-making process that are able to impede radical reform of the CAP, by using 
our two approaches.  
We also examine the affect of the external influence on the CAP. The purpose of this part is to show 
how the institutional barriers enable the EU to withstand the external pressure.  
The analysis of the Commission’s mandate is carried out to show which actors that are involved and 
how they can control the development of a negotiation mandate and thereby restrict the Commis-
sion’s scope of power in the negotiation process at the international scene.  
The figure below illustrates our project design. 
 
                                                 
7
 We will not emphasise the role of the Parliament in this project, as our approach focuses on the relationship between 
the Commission and the Council.  
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Theoretical perspectives 
In the following we seek to give an overview of the most important scholars and their approaches 
within the CAP research area to emphasise the different angles in the context from which our ap-
proaches has developed. 
One of the key scholars, who has influenced the research area of the CAP most, is Robert D. Put-
nam. Putnam’s work has had considerable influence and is commonly referenced in the studies of 
the CAP, and among others Patterson, Colemann and Tangermann, and Paarlberg have among oth-
ers employed his analytical two-level games framework.8 Putmans work emphasise the relations 
between domestic and international affairs in the negotiating process. He calls it a two-level game 
and describes it as a metaphor for domestic-international interactions.9 This approach is developed 
by Tangermann and Colemann. They have added a third dimension, the EU-level, and this approach 
                                                 
8
 Daugbjerg (2005):5 
9
 Putnam (1988):433 
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is called a multi-level game. They discuss how the international negotiations in the GATT influ-
enced the final output of the Macsharry reform. There are two basic opinions about this issue. The 
first is represented by Paarlberg, who argues, that the Uruguay round had no or hardly any impact 
on the reforms – actually the negotiations only delayed the decision-making process. The losses 
suffered by the delay was much bigger than the benefits of the Uruguay-round. And the second 
opinion, which is advocated by Tangermann and Colemann states, that the Uruguay round made the 
subsequent task of implementing the pledges of the negotiations much easier, because the national 
leaders could ignore the national opposition in an international forum.10   
Another approach to examine the CAP is by using the Public Choice approach. The central idea is 
that an important motive for individual actions is a rational-choice about economic gains.11  This 
approach argues that the lack of a radical reform is a consequence of the interests of the farmers, 
who want subsidies, combined within the interest of agriculture ministers, who want rural votes, 
and in the interest of the bureaucrats, who want complex regulation, which increase the number of 
staff and improve their career possibilities.12 Nedergaard is among others advocating for this ap-
proach.  
These are some of the central approaches that we have excluded from our project but still have in 
mind when we examine the two chosen approaches in our project. 
Now we have looked at some different approaches, which gives an overview over the research area 
of the CAP and thereby lead us to an examination of our analytical approaches - the principal agent 
and the policy network theories.  
The aim of this project is not to give an absolute answer to the often-asked question; “why doesn’t 
the EU change the expensive and controversial agriculture policy”, but rather to expose a single 
dimension of this complex topic. As we have seen the CAP has been subject to uncountable analy-
ses, since it emerged with the Rome treaty in 1957. In this chapter we will present some theoretical 
approaches with the purpose of contextualizing the two theoretical approaches. As we have shown 
that the angle we have chosen to expose, is one option out of many. This contextualizing will as 
well be used to argue for our theoretical optic. We will focus on the rational choice and the govern-
ance approach as our theoretical point of departure has been developed within these two ap-
proaches. 
 
                                                 
10
 Colemann and Tangermann (1999) :386 
11
 Lynggaard (2005):21 
12
 Daugbjerg (1999):10 
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It remains controversial whether the EU we have today is a product of the common European inte-
gration or of purely national considerations. This is the central and most basic issue in theorizing 
European policy-making, and is represented by two fundamental theoretical approaches, neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism, which each contain a different set of implications and 
hypotheses about the nature of the EU policy-process. Until the 1980’s all EU scholars continued 
the neo-functionalist/intergovernmentalist struggles – with few modifications.13 Then the re-
launched integration14 process provided focus and made the limits of the two traditional theories 
visible and created a field of new theories. However, all the new theories have roots in the two basic 
theories, and the rise of the institutionalist analysis was inspired by the neo-functionalistic ap-
proach.15 Later the development of the new-institutionalism became connected to the rational 
choice theory and the rational choice institutionalism emerged. Within this approach we find the 
“Principal-agent” theory, which Mark Pollack, among others, has developed. In the beginning, the 
rational choice scholars in the U.S. noted that majoritarian models on institutional decision-making 
predicted that policy outcomes could always form a coalition to overturn existing legislation.16 The 
argument behind is that political actors are “rational”, and always have a clear set of preferences 
about what outcome they want from the political process.17 The principal-agent developed this ap-
proach and problematized the conditions under which principals are able – or unable – to control 
their respective agents.  
 
The governance approach, which has recently emerged, treats EU fundamentally different from 
other polities and therefore requiring new theoretical approaches. One can look at the governance 
approach, as constituting a distinct research agenda across the traditional approaches like the com-
parativist, international relations and rational approach.18 However, the concept “Governance” has 
derived from both comparative and international relations literature which can be seen in the fact 
that many of the key themes – the emphasis on non-hierarchical networks, on public-private institu-
tions, and on the prospects for governance rather then government – are common for the govern-
ance approach and the comparative and international relation approach. 19 
                                                 
13
 Wallace (2005):18 
14
 Namely the introduction of the Single Europaen Act in 1986. 
15
 Rosamond (2000): 99-100 
16
 Wallace (2005):20 
17
 Hix (1999):12 
18
 Wallace (2005):38 
19
 Wallace (2005):38 
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The development of the Governance approach was also a reaction to the rigid conflict between neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism – a new way to understand EU-policy. Within this ap-
proach there are two central approaches, which often is used together – the multi-level governance 
and EU policy networks. The recognition of the existence of a policy network highlights the impor-
tance of informal processes and relationships in policy making20. 
We have chosen to work with the policy network approach with the purpose to cover the informal 
part of the decision-making. Then it would be natural to choose the multilevel governance as they 
are, as Pollack describes, “married”21. However, a combination of these two has been carried out 
several times before, and our analysis would therefore not bring anything new. In its place we have 
chosen to combine the policy network analysis, with the “principal agent” approach. The reason is, 
that we seek to cover both the informal and formal side of the decision making process. As we 
know, “the principal agent”, has focus on the formal side of the decision-making - the visible con-
flict of preferences between principal and agents. By contrast, the policy network approach empha-
sise the informal influence of the actors surrounding the EU. 
Furthermore the “principal agent” approach has a macro-level point of departure, and this is also an 
argument for combining the two approaches, as the policy network cover the meso-level side of the 
decision making process.  
 
By combining these two approaches, it is possible for us to analyse the decision-making process and 
ensure a comprehensive answer to the research question.    
 
Principal-Agent theory  
In this project we use the principal-agent theory as an analytical tool to examine the different types 
of functions and competences the member states has decided to delegate to supranational institu-
tions to understand the relationship between member states and Commission. This relationship is 
examined to understand to what extent the supranational institutions are able to carry out their func-
tions independent of the influence from the member states and what remedies the member states 
possess to avoid this. These remedies or mechanisms gives the member states opportunities to exert 
control over the delegated powers of the Commission, which can help us to elaborate on the institu-
tional barriers that might impede reform. 
                                                 
20
 Heywood (1997):38 
21
 Wallace (2005):39 
Page 11 of 39 
Delegation  
Delegation means that authority from one or more principals (group of member states) is handed 
over to one or more agents (supranational institutions such as the Commission), which gives the 
agent autonomy.  
The principal-agent model of delegation has identified a number of reasons for why principals 
might choose to delegate authority, the most important one is pointed out by Pollack; member states 
can choose to delegate autonomy to institutions in order to lower the transaction costs of interna-
tional cooperation. The cost of the agent’s autonomy might be considered as lower from the view of 
the principal than the cost of the principal being held responsible for some policy decisions.22  The 
supranational agents can observe the member states compliance with or indiscretion of their interna-
tional agreements obligations. Supranational agents may solve problems of incomplete contracting 
where for example agreements lack of explicit details of obligation. Where uncertainty is great and 
future decision-making is expected to be time consuming and complex the parties may agree to 
delegate authority to an agent who can obtain the fulfilment of the details in the respective agree-
ment.23  
The reason for the principals to delegate authority can also be to obtain credibility by using an inde-
pendent agent who might have less incentive to push for certain interests member states might have, 
and to circumvent too many diverse preferences of proposals from the member states. This is why 
the Commission has been delegated powers to be the agenda-setter.24 These are also the reasons 
why the Commission has sole initiative power in the EU and the negotiating power at the WTO-
level.  
 
The mechanisms of member state control 
Pollack explains the relationship between the agent and the principals as “EC institutions […] pur-
sue their own preferences within the confines of member state control mechanisms whose efficacy 
and credibility vary from issue to issue and over time.” 25 
Preferences can clash between the ones of the agency; the Commission, and the ones of the princi-
pals; the member states. When the agent has been delegated powers it might use it to pursue its own 
                                                 
22
 Kerreman (2004):5 
23
 Pollack (1997):103-104 
24
 Pollack (1997):103-104 
25
 Pollack (1997):110 
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preferences at the expense of the ones of the principals. “There is almost always some conflict be-
tween the interests of those who delegate authority (principals) and the agents to whom they dele-
gate it. Agents behave opportunistically, pursuing their own interests subject only to the constraints 
imposed by their relationship with the principal[s]”.26  This is the primary source of agency losses, 
because the principal can constrain the agent. The agent trying to avoid this discharging is called 
“shirking” or bureaucratic drift.  
Another concept regarding to the actions of the Commission is labelled “slippage” and emerge 
when “the structure of delegation itself provides perverse incentives for the agent to behave in ways 
inimical to the preferences of the principals.” 27 The clashes of preferences create a conflict and are 
the central problem of principal-agent analysis. The principals are not helpless in the process of 
shirking or slippage, since it has control mechanisms available to constrain the supranational agents.  
Oversight and administrative procedures 
When delegating authority to an agent the principal can adopt administrative procedures (legal in-
struments) and thereby limit the scope of agency activities. Oversight procedures are mechanisms 
for the member states to monitor the agent’s actions to ensure it does not exceed its scope of power.  
A control mechanism available for the principals is to sanction the agent, which can cause implica-
tions for the agent’s autonomy. But the agent can sometimes avoid these sanctions where clashes of 
preferences between the principals exists because “If any one of the […] principals is made better 
off by the agent’s shirking, then the principal will block the application of sanctions – allowing the 
agent to pursue its own preferences without the risk of sanction.” 28  
However, in order to minimize this shirking of the agent the principals can refuse to comply with an 
agent’s decision and refuse to reappoint agency personnel.29  
But Pollack states that: “Perhaps the most effective sanction against a shirking agent is the revision 
of its mandate by amending the treaty or regulation that delegates authority to it.”30  
Amending the treaty is however difficult because it requires unanimity and ratification by each 
member state. Therefore it’s impossible for a single member state to block this revision, which 
                                                 
26
 Pollack (1997):108 
27
 Pollack (1997):108 
28
 Pollack (1997):111-112 
29
 Pollack (1997):116 
30
 Pollack (1997):118 
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makes treaty revision a complicated and comprehensive mechanism of control for the member 
states31  
However, some of the Commission’s executive powers - among these is the Commission’s role in 
agriculture - are not explicit laid down in the treaty provisions. For that reason the Council is obli-
gated “to confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the imple-
mentation of the rules which the Council lays down.” 32   
Some of the Commission’s powers are, as said, established by Council regulations with fixed expi-
ration dates, which leaves an effective control mechanism for the member states to periodic revise 
the Commission’s mandate because the channel is the Council and not the treaty. This is a common 
procedure in EU policymaking.33 
We can conclude that there are several mechanisms for the member states to exert control over the 
Commission. This can be done by changing the administrative procedures to become more restric-
tive, which can result in a loss of flexibility of the agent’s activities and limit their administrative 
authorities. Oversight procedures are for the principals to monitor and influence agency behaviour 
and can be used by the principal in response to shirking.34 
 
Comitology system 
The member states use of a Comitology system to control the powers of the Commission. 
Because, as mentioned earlier, most of the Commission’s executive powers are specified in Council 
of Ministers legislation the Commission’s activities are subject to oversight committees where 
member states can use committee procedure in response of the Commission shirking. There are 
three types of oversight committees; advisory, management and regulatory. 
Advisory committee procedure: The Commission refers proposed actions to committee which “if 
necessary” vote by simple majority, but the Commission is only obligated to take the “utmost 
account” of the committees opinion, and hence not compelled to follow the outcome of this 
procedure. The advisory procedure is where the Commission has the most autonomy power 
and the member states the least influence. This is most common in competition policy areas. 
Management committee procedure: The Commission refers its proposed actions to the committee, 
which vote by qualified majority. If it is in favour of the proposal it may be adopted, but if it’s 
                                                 
31
 Pollack (1997):118 
32
 Pollack (1997):106 
33
 Pollack (1997):119 
34
 Pollack (1997):108 
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not, the proposal goes on to the Council, which can make a different decision by qualified ma-
jority vote. This procedure is more restrictive than the advisory committee procedure because 
the double qualified majority vote constrains the adoption of the Commission’s proposed ac-
tion. This procedure dominates the decision-making in agriculture policy. 
Regulatory committee procedure: The Commission’s proposed actions can only be adopted when 
approved by qualified majority voting in a committee. Here a minority can secure a reference 
to the Council unlike management procedure, and the Council can change or even block the 
proposal. Therefore this is a more restrictive procedure with more control of the Commis-
sion.35  
The central issue is to what extent these comitology procedures enable the member states to control 
the actions of the Commission. Whether the Commissions discretion is constrained depending on 
which oversight procedure is chosen and obviously the Commission and member state often dis-
agree choice of procedure.36 
Agenda setting 
The Commissions formal agenda-setting powers depend on voting and amendment rules in the 
process.  
The Commission has the power to set the agenda on the behalf of the Council. The power of initia-
tive is the most obvious condition for influence and places the Commission as the Community’s 
formal agenda setter. The influence of an agenda-setter will be the greatest where it is easier to 
adopt a proposal than amend. Cooperation and sometimes consultation procedures have voting rules 
of qualified majority. An amendment requires unanimity, which makes it harder to carry out. 
Adopting a proposal is easier than amending it; Council can adopt by Qualified Majority Vote but 
needs unanimity to amend a proposal.37 
Distribution of preferences is another important factor in the power of an agenda setter. This point 
underlines that the agenda-setting power depends on both the distribution of Commission prefer-
ences and member states preferences. The Commission has to propose its draft and if it is adopted 
in Council by qualified majority vote the outcome will reflect the Commission’s preferences. If 
member states reject the proposal and prefer to remain at status quo the Commission is unable to 
improve status quo. The power of an agenda-setter depends also on time horizons or impatience of 
                                                 
35
 Pollack (1997):114-115 
36
 Pollack (1997):115 
37
 Pollack (1997):101-102 
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the agenda setter and the principals. The theory assumes that member states give a positive vote for 
any proposal that leaves them better off than status quo even if the proposal is far from their own 
preferences.38 
 
To sum up the focal points of this part using the principal-agent terms the member states are classi-
fied as principals and the Commission as the supranational agent. The member states have dele-
gated some of their sovereignty to the Commission, which thereby has the power to initiate and 
negotiate for all member states of the European Union.  
The delegating of power creates a clash of preferences among the member states and the Commis-
sion. To what extent the agent and the principal are able to pursue their own preferences depends on 
the system of voting rules, the administrative and oversight procedures and the agenda setting, 
which all vary over time and across policy issues. 
The decision-making process reflects the clashes of preferences between the member states and the 
Commission in deciding which voting system that shall be applied for approving a proposal. Quali-
fied majority voting will be preferred by the Commission because it is easier to have a proposal 
approved by using this voting system. The member states, on the other hand, prefer to adopt a pro-
posal by consensus, which increases their influence on the decision and thereby makes it easier to 
impede the proposal. 
The member states use the administrative and oversight procedures to control the Commission’s 
actions by regulating its room of manoeuvre. The member states also monitor the Commission’s 
actions by using the comitology system to ensure that it does not exceeds its mandate. 
Policy networks 
 
The purpose of this part is to show that an agriculture network exists in the institutional structure of 
the EU and to demonstrate how networks are able to influence the decision-making process and 
thereby reforms. This part emphasises the informal factors in the process of decision-making and 
how these factors enables networks to impede radical reform. 
 
                                                 
38
 Pollack (1997):123 
Page 16 of 39 
Policy network and the EU 
In this project we use the policy network analysis at the EU level instead of the original approach to 
analyse policy networks at national level.39 However, this approach is not unique. Carsten 
Daugbjerg, among others, has made a similar analysis of the influence of policy networks on the 
development of the CAP and policy outcomes in the EU. Daugbjerg emphasises, that the policy 
network analysis is well suited for the analysis of EU policy processes, and state three distinct rea-
sons. First, the EU is a relatively young political system, which lacks formal and well-established 
institutions. Secondly, many decisions are made very early in the political process, where political 
actors such as technical experts and interest organizations have a significant role in the develop-
ment. Analysis of this informal relationship between the Commission and the political actors is one 
of the strengths of the network analysis. Finally, the Commission and the political actors are de-
pendent on each others resources; the need for information and the practise of obtaining and ex-
changing this information by collaboration. This exchange of resources creates a policy network. 
This is why the network analysis is suitable at the union level. 40 
One of the main reasons why we find the Policy Network analysis appropriate for answering our 
research question is that: “The existence of policy network within a policy field can usually help to 
explain why groups who benefit from a policy succeed in resisting pressure for radical reform, and 
thus network analysis is a useful approach to analysing the absence of fundamental reforms of the 
CAP.” 41 
The term policy network is described by Daugbjerg as “[...] an organizational arrangement created 
to facilitate the intermediation between state actors and organized interests.”42 Where the theory 
emphasises the structural relation between the, in this case more specific, the Directorates Generals 
and the political actors such as interest groups. 
Hall explains how the outcome of a reform can be influenced by the organisational structure: “or-
ganizational structure tends to lead policy-makers into some courses of action and away from oth-
ers; and each course tends to favour the interests of some social groups over others.”43  And 
Daugbjerg extends this view by combining the institutional structure of the EU with agricultural 
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policy network and argues, that policy-makers can be led in the direction of moderate rather than 
radical reforms.44  
 
Policy network - a meso-level approach 
Before we go into the discussion of policy networks it is however relevant to describe the analysis 
more exhaustively. As mentioned above the analysis was originally developed to analyse policy 
networks at a national level. Rhodes and March are two of the architects behind the national devel-
opment of the analysis. Rhodes and March describe the analysis as a meso-level theory, with the 
government (or in a EU context the Commission) being the macro-level.45 Meso-level policy net-
works are embedded in the institutional context and at the EU level it refers to the broader political 
structure of the Union, thereby the policy network theory describes both transnational and transgov-
ernmental networks which can influence the policy outcome, whether it becomes a moderate or 
radical reform.46   
In their description they describe different types of policy networks on a continuum with two poles.   
One being the policy community and the second being the issue network. The continuum between 
to two poles is where other configurations of networks can be placed.47  
The characteristics of the policy community can be described by; “limited number of participants 
with some groups consciously excluded; a dominant economic or professional interest; frequent 
interaction between all members of the community on all matters related to the policy issues; con-
sistency in values, membership, and policy outcome over time; consensus, with the ideology, values 
and broad policy preferences shared by all participants; exchange relations with all members of the 
policy community having some resources; bargaining between members with resources; and the 
hierarchical distribution of resources with in the participating organisations so that leaders can 
guarantee the compliance of their members.”48  
At the other end of the continuum lies the issue network, which is described by; “competition be-
tween a large number of participants and a range of interests; fluctuating interaction and access 
for the various members; the absence of consensus and the presence of conflict; consultation rather 
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then bargaining; and an unequal power relation in which many participants have limited resources 
and restricted access”49 
It is made clear by Rhodes and March that the two pole descriptions of the networks are ideal types, 
which will probably not exist in pure form anywhere where the two descriptions are only meant as 
descriptions of the two extremes of a continuum. The definition of a policy community can vary in 
configuration in multiple ways, i.e. it can be tightly integrated due to continuity and consensus or 
due to a dominant interest, in either case it could still be described as a policy community.50  
In the article by Rhodes and Marsh some key issues are brought forward that are not answered by 
the description of the spectrum between the two extreme positions. These issues can help to clarify 
the theory.51 One of these key issues is the question of how and when policy networks change. A 
relevant example is how the institutional reconfigurations influence the networks. Rhodes and 
March uses the European Community as an example.52 
 
Cohesion of the network 
Where Rhodes and March discuss a continuum of networks ranging from policy communities to 
issue networks, Daugbjerg focus on the existence of a policy network and how it can influence the 
outcome of a decision-making process. This require an analysis of policy networks surrounding the 
CAP policy of the European Union, which can be acknowledged if there is a consistency in the 
overall policy objectives and cohesion within and around the network.53 
With regards to cohesion, it can be determined by analysing whether there has been stability on 
policy objectives over time. If consensus has prevailed and policy objectives have not changed there 
is a high degree of cohesion.54 When there are consensus and cohesion in a policy network it is 
more likely to withstand pressure for reform and defend the existing policy paradigm.55 
With regards to the stability in the overall objectives, Daugbjerg shows that from the beginning of 
CAP as part of the European Unions responsibilities there has been a impressive stability of the 
objective of the CAP, where the main objective to ensure a fair living standard for farmers still pre-
vail, and the interventionist and protectionist policy paradigm in the overall objectives is preserved 
                                                 
49
 Rhodes (1992):187 See also the typology of policy networks made by March and Rhodes in Daugbjerg (1998):31,    
table 1.1 
50
 Rhodes (1992):188 
51
 Rhodes (1992):188 
52
 Rhodes (1992):194 
53
 Daugbjerg (1999):416 
54
 Daugbjerg (1999):416 
55
 Daugbjerg (1999):413 
Page 19 of 39 
in article 33 of the Treaty of Rome and is not questioned by the members of the agricultural net-
work.56 This provision of the CAP still exists after several revisions of the treaties, and has been 
emphasized by the Commission on several occasions.57 Daugbjerg therefore argues that a very visi-
ble stability can be seen in the CAP policy of the European union. 
 
Members of these policy networks are often experts in a certain issue area and are therefore able to 
construct strong arguments for preserving the status quo, even though there is pressure for reform. 
However, usually they have to give something up to avoid radical reforms, which can result in 
moderate changes – first and second order policy changes.58  
Daugbjerg shows, that the members and particular core members of the CAP policy network of the 
European Union are the same over a long period of time. He states that until the early 1980s 
COPA59, DG AGRI and national agriculture ministers were the core members of the agriculture 
network. At the beginning of the 1980s, the increasing pressure of an eminent budgetary crisis 
changed the role of COPA in the network. As COPA could not deliver realistic proposals for the 
development of the CAP, the network saw a decrease in the power of COPA, but an increase in the 
power of the special committee of agriculture.60  
Two interesting conclusions can be drawn from Daugbjerg’s analysis of the existence of a policy 
network. First; the network has shown a strong cohesion because the overall policy objectives are 
the same and there has been a very limited replacement of members of the network. But secondly; 
the change that happened in the members of the network was a result of new economic require-
ments.  
 
To sum up; the exchange of information between the Commission and the political actors and the 
interdependence of resources creates a network. The types of policy networks vary but there exist 
two contrasting poles – the policy community, where there is uniformity in values and objectives, 
and there is stability in policy outcome over time. A consensus and broad policy preferences are 
shared by all members, which possess resources. The other pole - the issue network, consist of 
range of interests where disagreement and the presence of conflict is present, and the members have 
limited resources. 
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A policy network with cohesion and in consensus is unlikely to allow a third order policy change – 
a radical reform, but only moderate reforms.  
 
Operationalizing the theories 
After the preceding presentation of our two theories, we will now describe how we will combine 
and operationalize the theories. The objective is to make it clear which analytical tools we will use 
in the following analysis chapter. We begin with the principal agent approach. 
Pollack has developed different terms to explain the relationship, the conflicts and in general the 
balance of power between the agent and the principal. As one of the most important can be men-
tioned “clashes of preferences”, which will be one out of several tools that we utilize to illustrate the 
institutional barriers in the decision making. As the principal agent theory is a macro-level and ver-
tical approach and thereby it shows where and how the principals formally have delegated power to 
the agent. Hence, the tools of the principal agent theory will be used to show the formal structure of 
the decision-making process and thereby the formal institutional barriers.  
 
Our other theoretical perspective is the policy network theory. Where the Principal Agent theory 
can help us to understand the formal part of the decision-making such as the member states control 
mechanisms, the network analysis can help us to understand the informal part of the decision-
making process, where different networks exercise influence. As this approach is horizontal61 and 
fluctuates at a meso-level, it illustrates how, on all levels of the decision-making process, networks 
of representatives with interests in the specific area affect the proposals. Making a network analysis 
of different stages of the decision-making process will help us to show how organized the different 
networks are. 
By combining the two theories, we will be able to firstly show how power of decision-making is 
delegated from the member states to the Commission, and how the member states retain the dele-
gated powers of the Commission. This is done by a macro-level and vertical approach, which illus-
trates the formal structure of the institutional barriers that are able to impede reform. Complemen-
tary, we also show the informal and horizontal part of the institutional structure of the decision-
making by explaining how the networks are involved in the individual decisions at all levels and 
how they are able to hinder radical reforms.  
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To sum up, the abovementioned demonstrates that in order to explain policy outcomes a makro-
level analysis as the principal-agent theory is useful to show the formal institutional barriers. But to 
understand why radical reforms have not succeeded it is necessary to emphasise a meso-level analy-
sis as the policy network approach, which illuminate the influence of the networks within the insti-
tutional structure.  
 
Analysis of the CAP decision-making 
In this chapter we begin the analysis of the decision-making procedure of reforms of the CAP.62 
The chapter is essentially divided in two parts and we will first and primarily look at the decision-
making procedure of reforms of the CAP, and after this look at how the European Union can with-
stand the pressure from external interests in the context of the international trade negotiations in the 
WTO. 
The structure of this chapter starts by a description of the different stages in the procedure, and then 
we divide the description into three parts. First we will describe the legislative framework, which 
the procedure has to follow (this means the treaties in the case of the internal EU questions, and the 
EU position in the WTO trade negotiation framework.). Next we will describe how the procedures 
function in practise. And finally we will analyse whether any institutional barriers can be found at 
the relevant stage of the procedure. For this final step we will use the analytical framework devel-
oped on the basis of the theoretical chapters. 
We will describe of the decision-making process chronologically, where we begin with the initially 
development of a proposal, and towards the implementation-phase.  
Development of proposal 
This first stage of the decision-making process is the development from idea or pressure for a 
change of the CAP to the written text, that are send further on in the decision-making process. As 
mentioned we will start by looking at the legislative framework that govern this stage. 
Legislative framework 
Changes and reforms of the CAP is stated in the treaty of the European Union: 
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“The Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parlia-
ment, acting by a qualified majority, make regulations, issue directives, or take decisions, without 
prejudice to any recommendations it may also make.”63 
Here it is clarified in writing that the Commission has to come with proposals, which is a normal 
procedure to most policy areas of the union. The objectives given in the treaty are described in arti-
cle 33(1) of the EC Treaty. The objectives have origin in the Treaty of Rome and they have re-
mained the same, through the treaty revisions. These objectives still reflex the interventionist and 
protectionist foundation of the CAP in order to ensure a fair standard of living for farmers, to in-
crease agricultural productivity and to stabilise markets.64   
Development of proposal in practise 
Within the Commission proposals for changes of policies of the European Union originates from 
the individual DGs, which are subdivisions of the Commission65 (the political DG’s are headed by 
Commissionaires).66 In the DGs the proposal can originate from either the Commissionaire, the 
cabinet around the Commissionaire or the civil servants in the DG. Even though the proposals 
originate from individuals or organisations in the formal institutional structure of the EU, this 
should not be seen as a description of a system where totally individuals and isolated entities sud-
denly bring forward new proposal. Due to the fact that the DGs have limited resources, they are 
dependent on to obtaining information outside the institution, from organisations that have a closer 
relation to the policy area.67 Therefore the proposals are developed with extensive discussions with 
interest outside the DG. 
Concerning agriculture the initial steps in formulating a proposal are taken in the Commission by 
the Directorate General for Agriculture, when there is pressure for reform. The DG AGRI has the 
expertise and knowledge of the CAP, but utilises an extensive network to discuss the proposals. 
Around the DG AGRI the European organisation for farmers (COPA) and the individual member 
states agriculture ministries constitute this network. 
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After the proposal has been put into writing, it needs to be approved by the Commission as a col-
lected body, before the proposal can be entered into the decision-making process of the EU. The 
proposed text therefore leaves the hands of the DG and the respective Commissionaire, and is sent 
to the inter service group of the Commission. Here representatives of the individual DG’s discuss 
the proposal. 
Previously the DG AGRI has had little competition from other DG’s, but with the emergence of 
new DG’s, such as the DG for Budget or Environment, other DG’s have had more to say about the 
proposals from DG AGRI. The inclusion of agriculture in the international trade negotiations in the 
mid 1990s has created DG EXT, which is responsible for external relations and an active player in 
the development of CAP reforms.68 These different DG’s represents diverse interests, where the DG 
AGRI principally are for preserving the CAP and the DG EXT are for a liberalisation of trade and 
thereby for reforming the CAP.69 
If the negotiation between the individual DG’s and the individual Commissionaires succeed, the 
Commission approves the proposal by simple majority vote. After the approval the other institu-
tions of the European Union come into play.          
Institutional barriers in the formulation of a proposal 
By deciding that the CAP should be agreed upon, the member states have given up the control of 
their national agricultural policies. This is a legislative delegation of power from the principals 
(member states) to the agent (Commission). As we shall see in the next stage of the process, this 
will inevitably create some “clashes of preferences” between the member states and the Commis-
sion. As the member states have delegated the power to develop a proposal to the Commission, it is 
unlikely that they can influence this development by using their control mechanisms in the formal 
structure of the decision-making process. However, in the development of the proposal there is an 
informal aspect, which will be described in the following.   
It is interesting to look into the relationship between the DG AGRI and the interests outside this 
institution. There is a clear continuity in the arguments and proposals of the Commission, where the 
overall objective is to preserve the basic structure of the CAP, which is interventionist and protec-
tionist. According to Daugbjerg this indicates a policy community around the CAP.70 Daugbjerg 
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argues, that policy community will oppose radical reforms because these bring uncertainty and in-
stability and would jeopardize the overall objective of the CAP.71  
As the composition of the DG AGRI count all the expertise of agriculture, the discussions in the 
inter-service group, that has to combine the interests of the Commission as a whole, are often con-
trolled by DG AGRI as they are able to come with very technical arguments to counter objections 
from other DGs. They are in frequently contact with other parts of the network and thereby they 
exchange information and get updated on all details of the European agriculture. This makes DG 
AGRI the stronger member of the inter-service group72 and ensure, that only proposals of reform 
that DG AGRI can accept, are put on the table by the Commission.  
These arguments indicate that institutional barriers exist at this stage. As the policy community 
around the DG AGRI will oppose any proposals for radical reform from being put on the agenda, 
this does not happen. But still they have to give attention to the pressure for reform from the other 
political actors in the networks around the DG EXT, which can result in the proposal of some mod-
erate reforms, but not a third order change. This is a way for the policy community to avoid radical 
reforms to succeed. 
 
From proposal to final text 
After the Commission has drafted a proposal it has to be entered into the second stage of the deci-
sion-making process of the European Union. 
Legislative framework 
As described in the treaty the Council shall “…by a qualified majority, make regulations, issue di-
rectives, or take decisions…”73 based on “a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament” 74. This procedure is further described in article 251 of the treaty. Especially 
paragraph 2 of this article gives a description of the procedure.75 
As stated in this paragraph the proposals have to be submitted from the Commission to the Council 
that shall act by qualified majority in deciding the fate of the proposal. In this process it is possible 
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to make amendments of the proposal, but as stated in article 251 (3) these amendments has to be 
accepted by unanimity. 
From proposal to final text in practise 
Under most policy areas of the European Union the proposals from the Commission would be for-
warded to the Council and the parliament to be decided. The ministers are normally prepared by 
their representatives in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), meaning that 
this committee normally negotiate the proposals, and in 85% of the cases the negotiations has been 
finished before it progresses to the minister level. 
In the case of Agriculture the Union has established a Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA). 
Here representatives of member state agriculture ministries negotiate the proposals. In essence SCA 
is the agriculture equivalent of COREPER, but as it consists of agriculture representatives, the ne-
gotiations tend to be more technical than what would have been possible in COREPER. It is at-
tempted to reach a decision in the SCA on as many proposals as possible, so that the ministers only 
need to adopt the proposals, without further negotiation.76 In the end the proposals are either disap-
proved, approved or approved with amendments.  
In the treaty it is described how the Council can accept the proposals by qualified majority vote, this 
is very similar to other policy areas of the union, however in the case of agriculture the use of quali-
fied majority in the Council is close to never used in practise. This has been the case since the Lux-
embourg agreement of 1966 that stated, that where very important interests of individual member 
states were at stake, the Council should strive at consensus rather then qualified majority voting.77 
Institutional barriers in the decision-making from proposal to final text 
The fact that the Commission has been given the power of agenda-setting is a clear delegation of 
power from the principals to the agent. As mentioned before transfer of power normally results in 
“clashes of preferences”. This is also the case in the delegation of power from the MS to the Com-
mission.  
The power of the Commission is even increased in order to the fact that amendment of the proposal 
according to the formal procedure has to be accepted by unanimity, contrary to an approval of the 
proposal, which needs qualified majority voting. This has the consequence that member states find 
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it more difficult to amend a proposal than to approve a less than perfect, but still acceptable, pro-
posal.78   
If the proposal is a result of the Commission pursuing its own interests, a possible conflict between 
the preferences of the member states and the Commission can emerge. To avoid the shirking of the 
Commission the member states can disagree with the proposal and prevent it for being adopted by 
qualified majority voting. Even if the Commission could secure a qualified majority behind their 
proposal, single member states could argue that vital national interests were at stake, and consensus 
according to the Luxembourg compromise, has to be found in order to accept the proposal. This 
indicates, that the member states have regained essential powers in the delegation of powers to the 
Commission. This configuration indicates an institutional barrier towards radical reforms, as even 
the most reluctant member of the Union has to accept the proposal, in order to reach consensus79. 
Where disagreements among member states creates a conflict, because some are for liberalisation 
and some wants to preserve the status quo, the need for reaching consensus can be an institutional 
barrier. 
As a conclusion of this stage it can be stated that institutional barriers exist, as the Luxembourg 
compromise has ensured that the possible reform has to be acceptable to all members of the union. 
Hence, the most conservative members can always reject a proposal from the Commission that is 
unacceptable in order to their preferences – even if they are a small minority. 
 
Implementation of legislation 
If the proposals are adopted by the Council of agriculture ministers, the resulting legal text has to be 
implemented. Where implementation on many other policy areas is applied at national level, agri-
cultural legislation has to be implemented on a European level. This task has been delegated from 
the Council to the Commission. This requires a system of management and oversight at the Euro-
pean level. There have been established several management committees, which consist of repre-
sentatives of the member states and the Commission, who supervise and assist the day-to-day im-
plementation of the CAP.  
                                                 
78
 Pollack (2003):49-50 
79
 The history shows that at least one member state always has been against a more radical reform of the CAP. 
Page 27 of 39 
Legislative framework 
Article 211 of the treaty describes the function of the Commission in the union, where the Commis-
sion has executive power over the implementation of the proposals that the Council has approved.80 
However, the role of the committees are to supervise the actions of the Commission. This system of 
committees are referred to as the comitology system.   
Implementation in practise 
First the Commission has to report the measures for implementation to the management committee. 
The management committee then has to vote for the proposed measures from the Commission by 
qualified majority, and if it is rejected, the Council has to make a decision on the issue also by 
qualified majority. 81 Even though the Commission chairs these committees it cannot vote. 
Regarding agriculture the Council has organized 20 management committees situated on each of the 
product-areas that the CAP covers. The purpose of the management committees are not only to su-
pervise the implementation on the European level, but also to try to ensure that national “front-line” 
implementation institutions fulfil their obligations effectively.82  
Institutional barriers in implementation 
This comitology system is an effective control mechanism for the member states to supervise the 
implementation measures of the Commission. The principal agent theory can be used to illustrate 
how the oversight committees can prevent the Commission to pursue its own preferences and 
thereby ensure that the delegated powers do not contradict the member states’ preferences. These 
management committees are a very clear example of this, as the Commission has to present any 
measures that it wishes to implement for a committee. 
As mentioned above, if a proposed measure is rejected by qualified majority voting in the manage-
ment committees it is submitted qualified majority voting in the Council. This double qualified ma-
jority voting is a potential barrier for approval of the proposed measures that can constraint the 
Commission. Nevertheless, there is a low rate of committee referrals to the Council actually less 
than 1 percent, which implies that the Commission is aware of its limits and rarely exceed the scope 
of its delegated powers. 83 This shows that the comitology system is an effective control mechanism 
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for the member states and an essential institutional barrier for carrying out a radical reform in the 
formal decision-making process.  
 
Making a negotiation mandate 
In this second part of the analysis we look at the development of negotiation mandates for the EU 
when participating in international trade negotiations in WTO. We will keep the same structure as 
in the first part. This will help us to show how the European political system can withstand the pres-
sure from the WTO. Before the EU can participate in international trade negotiations, the Council 
has to develop a mandate, to which the Commission, as the Unions negotiator, are bound. 
Legislative framework 
The legislative framework for negotiating international trade agreements, as in WTO, can be found 
in the treaty article 133. From this it can be seen that it is possible for the Commission to initiate 
international negotiations for the EU. The special committee is also called the Article 133 commit-
tee as it is described in Article 133(3). This committee has to, as the treaty states, be consulted dur-
ing the negotiations, but is also involved in the development of the mandate.84 
Development of proposal in practise 
When the EU is to partake in the trade negotiations in WTO, a mandate is formulated by the Coun-
cil, which outlines what the member states find as an acceptable framework for negotiations. The 
initial proposal of the mandate is made by the Commission, with the DG EXT as the initiating DG. 
The development of a proposal for the mandate from the Commission is similar to that of proposals 
for reform or new legislation as described above.  
Individual DG’s deliver their proposals on their respective areas. The Inter Service Group then have 
the responsibility of coordinating the different inputs, and develop a proposal for a negotiation 
mandate that cover all the DG’s positions.85  
When the Commission has agreed upon a proposal for a mandate, the process of getting an approval 
from the Council is initiated. As with agriculture, the normal procedure of sending the proposal to 
the COREPER, does not apply for negotiation mandate proposals. In this case the Article 133 
Committee has to approve the proposal. This committee are, as mentioned, appointed by the Coun-
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cil, on the basis of article 133 (2) of the treaty of the European Union.86 The members of the com-
mittees are a group of senior civil servants from the national parliaments. This committee always 
has a representative of the agriculture ministry of the individual member state, which tend to take 
the initiative in the discussions.87 In this committee the decisions are reached by consensus. 
After the article 133 committee has reached an agreement, the proposal is, contrary to the agricul-
ture reform proposals, send to the COREPER and negotiated according to the normal procedure. 
When the Council finally has to vote on the negotiation mandate, the Council is only obliged to 
vote by qualified majority. However, the Council, as mentioned, usually attempt to reach consensus. 
When the mandate is accepted, the Commission is ready to go to the negotiations in the WTO. 
Institutional barriers in the development of a mandate 
The fact that the Commission negotiates for the union as a whole, indicates a significant transfer of 
power from the member states to the Commission. However, this delegated power is restricted, as 
the member states have control mechanisms available, which will be elaborated in the following.    
In the process of development of a proposal for a mandate, it reveals some diverging interests inside 
the Commission, because all the DG’s are represented. These policy networks that are surrounding 
this decision-making process can influence the outcome of the framework of the mandate.88  
In this context the member states individually can also influence the framework of the mandate if it 
is too wide and are thereby able to constrain the Commissions room for manoeuvre. When a man-
date is determined at the beginning of a negotiation process the outcome usually become more 
strict, because most conservative member states are able to pin the Commission down on a mini-
malist EU-position via the article 133 committee. This restricts the flexibility from the Commission 
actions because it results in difficulties for the Commission in adapting in the external negotiation 
process.89 However, during the negotiating process the mandate can be adjusted to the negotiations, 
but this has to be accepted by the Article 133 committee. 
The abovementioned indicates that the Article 133 committee constitutes an institutional barriers 
embedded in the process of the development of the mandate. 
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Negotiating in the WTO 
After the mandate is decided in the Council, the Commission is ready to go to the ministry meeting 
in WTO. The mandate outlines the position that the Council has accepted as a starting point for the 
negotiations, but as the negotiations proceed, the mandate probably needs revisions, in order for the 
Commission to adapt to the negotiations in the WTO. Here we will describe this stage. 
Legislative framework 
Since the rules governing the negotiation at the WTO, are not part of the treaty for the European 
Union the description here will concentrate on how the negotiations in the WTO are organized. We 
will however also look at the treaty basis that outlines how the Commission can act during the ne-
gotiations. 
When the Commission appears before the other members of the WTO and starts negotiating on be-
half of the EU, representatives of the individual EU member states are also present. WTO negotia-
tions are what is called a “packet deal”. This means that all aspects of the trade is open until an 
agreement on all areas has been reached. This process opens the possibilities for WTO members to 
achieve their goals in certain areas, at the cost of goals in other, but less important areas. However, 
this also opens the possibility of failure in achieving an overall objective of an agreement because 
of disagreements on single issues. When the Commission engages in negotiations on the behalf of 
the Union, the Council has ensured, by the use of the mandate, that the Commission does not make 
unnecessary concessions.  
If an agreement is achieved then all WTO member states have to sign it, this include the member 
states of the EU. This helps to explain why it is important to have consensus behind the negotiation 
mandate. A veto of one EU member state to the WTO agreement would reflect badly on the Com-
mission as a negotiator, and the consensus should help this from happening. 
Negotiating in the WTO in practise 
The Commission and the member states representatives of Article 133 committee interact in a nego-
tiation consisting both of opposition and cooperation. The opposition is to be understood as the 
member states control of the Commission, where the Article 133 committee is organized in a way to 
control the Commission at all stages of the external negotiating process.  
The cooperation between the Commission and Article 133 committee is important. It is necessary 
for the Commission to involve and inform the members of the committee as much as possible in the 
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process to prevent the Article 133 committee to restrict the Commission’s actions by restraining its 
powers in the negotiation.90  
Approval of the interpretation of the mandate happens when the 133 Committee reach consensus.91 
As consensus has been reached in the Article 133 Committee, the potential for consensus in the 
Council increases. 
Institutional barriers at the WTO negotiations 
The representatives from the agriculture ministry of the member states that participate in the agri-
culture negotiations via the Article 133 committee, belong to the policy community around the DG 
AGRI. This policy community therefore has a great influence at this level of the negotiations.  
When power is delegated from a principal to an agent, the agent has to interpret this mandate. This 
can result in shirking as defined in the principal agent chapter. Shirking is very difficult for the 
Commission as the Article 133 committee is present at the negotiations. In the terms of principal 
agent the article 133 committee constitutes an oversight committee of the work of the Commission 
at the negotiations. The presence of the Article 133 Committee makes it very difficult for the Com-
mission to make compromises in the negotiation, as the Article 133 Committee is present at the 
negotiation process, and must approve any changes suggested by the Commission, hence are able to 
interfere instantaneously.92 This is the same procedure as described above at the implementation 
stage.  
The DG EXT has the authority to negotiate in all other sectors but agriculture in the negotiating in 
the WTO. The DG AGRI is responsible for the negotiations of the agriculture sector, which is prob-
lematic as the DG, which has the strongest incentives to preserve the CAP is the head of negotia-
tions in the sector.93 
Furthermore, the need of consensus in the Council means than any member state can block changes 
of the EU negotiation position.“The structure of decision-making the EC GATT delegation could 
not be better designed to prevent such a possibility”.94 Thereby the degree of liberalisation of the 
CAP will depend on the most reluctant member state. 95   
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 Moyer (1993):104 
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We can sum up that during the negotiations at the WTO the EU has organized itself in a manner 
that ensures that pressure from other WTO members for a reform of the CAP can be withstood. In 
other words, we see institutional barriers that can preserve the status quo of the CAP. 
Conclusion  
The aim of this project has been stressed in the research question. We stated that our ambition was 
to expose institutional barriers that impede radical reforms.  
We have in the previous part shown that institutional barriers can be found at all the levels of the 
decision-making process. With the research question, we indicated, that three sub-questions would 
make it easier to show institutional barriers.  
The first question is concentrated on the location of barriers of the formal decision-making process. 
We have shown that the combination of the comitology- and the voting-system represent institu-
tional barriers. Two committees are involved in the negotiation and implementation process of pro-
posals for reforms. At the first stage – the negotiation of the proposal from the commission – the 
Special Committee for Agriculture has to agree on the text, before the council can adopt it. This is a 
strong institutional barrier, because the committee consists of representatives of agriculture minis-
ters of the individual member states. The barrier is strengthened by the voting-system, which in 
practise usually is submitted by unanimity. During the implementation the management committees 
ensure oversight of the Commission on the behalf of the member states. This results in a second 
institutional barrier, as the Commission is not able to take actions that are in conflict with the pref-
erences of the member states. If the Commission suggest implementation actions that the member 
states disagree upon, the management committee can refer the proposal to the Council. 
Our second sub-question focuses on informal institutional barriers. During the development of the 
proposal in the DG AGRI, several external interests are involved. Because of the clear continuity of 
the objectives of this network we conclude, that it is a policy community. The members of the pol-
icy community are the DG AGRI, COPA and the national agriculture ministers, who all share a 
common interest in avoiding radical reforms of the CAP. The policy community is directly repre-
sented, via the DG AGRI,  and thereby it has a strong influence on the development of the proposal. 
The community’s strengths is increased by the fact that all members are experts in agriculture, and 
are therefore able to conduct the negotiations on a much more technical level, which makes their 
arguments stronger when setting the agenda. This indicates another institutional barrier, as radical 
reforms will be difficult to get through the network and thereby on the agenda. 
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The third sub-question concerns the ability of the EU to withstand pressure of external influence. 
The presence of the Article 133 committee, both at the negotiations and in the development of the 
mandate, and the networks presence in the Article 133 committee, is an institutional barrier, as the 
networks can influence the negotiations directly. 
With the complexity and strong involvement of the agriculture network in the negotiations, it is near 
to impossible for the Commission as a negotiator to make any concessions to the other WTO mem-
bers, who generally argue for liberalisation. The EU negotiation systems are designed in a manner 
that makes it easy to resist pressure from external interest. 
 
The general conclusion of this project is, that there are institutional barriers embedded in the EU 
decision-making process that makes radical reforms unlikely to succeed. It is our opinion that ex-
tensive changes in the decision-making process are needed for radical reforms ever to happen. 
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Annex 1 
 
A) Article 33 (1) 
 
“(a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring the ra-
tional development of agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of the factors of produc-
tion, in particular labour; 
(b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increas-
ing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; 
(c) to stabilise markets; 
(d) to assure the availability of supplies; 
(e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.” 
 
B) Article 251 (2 & 3) 
 
2. “ The Commission shall submit a proposal to the European Parliament and the Council. 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament: 
— if it approves all the amendments contained in the European Parliament's opinion, may 
adopt the proposed act thus amended, 
—  if the European Parliament does not propose any amendments, may adopt the proposed act, 
— shall otherwise adopt a common position and communicate it to the European Parliament. 
The Council shall inform the European Parliament fully of the reasons which led it to adopt 
its common position. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament fully of its po-
sition. 
If, within three months of such communication, the European Parliament: 
(a) approves the common position or has not taken a decision, the act in question shall be 
deemed to have been adopted in accordance with that common position; 
(b) rejects, by an absolute majority of its component members, the common position, the pro-
posed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted; 
(c) proposes amendments to the common position by an absolute majority of its component 
members, the amended text shall be forwarded to the Council and to the Commission, which 
shall deliver an opinion on those amendments.”96 
                                                 
96
 The EC Treaty Article 251 (2) 
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3. “If, within three months of the matter being referred to it the Council acting by a qualified ma-
jority, approves all the amendments of the European Parliament, the act in question shall be 
deemed to have been adopted in the form of the common position thus amended; however, the 
Council shall act unanimously on the amendments, on which the Commission has delivered a nega-
tive opinion. If the Council does not approve all the amendments,  the President of the Council, in 
agreement with the President of the European Parliament, shall within six weeks convene a meeting 
of the Conciliation Committee.” 
 
C) Article 211 
“In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market, the Commis-
sion shall: 
— ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant 
thereto are applied, 
— formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in this Treaty, if it ex-
pressly so provides or if the Commission considers it necessary, 
— have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of measures taken by the 
Council and by the European Parliament in the manner provided for in this Treaty, 
— exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of the rules laid 
down by the latter.” 
 
D) Council decision 1999/468/EC article 4 
“Management procedure” 
1. The Commission shall be assisted by a management committee composed of the representatives 
of the Member States and chaired by the representative of the Commission. 
2. The representative of the Commission shall submit to the committee a draft of the measures to be 
taken. The committee shall deliver its opinion on the draft within a time-limit which the chairman 
may lay down according to the urgency of the matter. The opinion shall be delivered by the major-
ity laid down in Article 205(2) of the Treaty, in the case of decisions which the Council is required 
to adopt on a proposal from the Commission. The votes of the representatives of the Member States 
within the committee shall be weighted in the manner set out in that Article. The chairman shall not 
vote. 
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3. The Commission shall, without prejudice to Article 8, adopt measures which shall apply immedi-
ately. However, if these measures are not in accordance with the opinion of the committee, they 
shall be communicated by the Commission to the Council forthwith. In that event, the Commission 
may defer application of the measures which it has decided on for a period to be laid down in each 
basic instrument but which shall in no case exceed three months from the date of such communica-
tion. 
4. The Council, acting by qualified majority, may take a different decision within the period pro-
vided for by paragraph 3.” 
  
E) Article 133(2, 3 & 4)  
2.” The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common commer-
cial policy.”   
3. “Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need to be negotiated, 
the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission 
to open the necessary negotiations. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensur-
ing that the agreements negotiated are compatible with internal Community policies and rules.” 
“The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee ap-
pointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such direc-
tives as the Council may issue to it. The Commission shall report regularly to the special committee 
on the progress of negotiations.”  
 
4. “In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act by a qualified 
majority.” 
